Comparative Studies in Society and History
Vol. 17, No. 2.
April 1975
Pages 221-237

Socio-political Accomodation and Religious Decline:

The Case of the Molokan Sect in Soviet Society

Molokanism flourished in Tsarist times becaue it was an alternative "utopian" society attracting people from the dominant Orthodox and othe religions. By the Russian revolution, Molokans were the largest and most widely-spread Russian sect. But, during Soviet times it failed to attract new members, and those looking for an alternative world view joined other Western religions, except the Leapers/Jumpers and Maksimisti in the Caucasus. Since 1990, after peritroika, over 150 Molokan -- Constant (majority), Spiritual, Jumper, and Maksimisti -- congregations surfaced in the FSU largely continuing their "sectarian" existence by the force of tradition. But their close-knit community has become more and more difficult to maintain.

Christel O. Lane
London School of Economics

The Molokan sect, one of the strongest and most influential in pre-revolutionary Russia, is today moving towards extinction. [Due to peristroika about 150 Molokan communities can be identified today in the FSU. About one-third are registered.] This process, however, has not gone equally far in different geographical areas of the Soviet Union. This paper puts forward an assessment of the extent of the sect's decline and attempts to explain both the general decline and its differential rate in different communities. It analyses the sect's development over a long period of time and under radically different socio-political conditions and it tries to systematize the Molokans' changing response to their different social environments, locating the sect in the typology devised by Bryan Wilson. It concludes that the severe decline in membership during the Soviet period is due to the fact that the Molokan sect is no longer an organization through which political dissent can be expressed but has fully adjusted to and affirms the values of Communist society. In the paper it is pointed out that although the sect can be typified in Wilson's terms during its early period, its changed response in Soviet society is not anticipated in Wilson's scheme. Existence in the exceptional social environment of socialist society has called forth an exceptional sectarian response. To illuminate this process we will consider both the Molokans' historical development and their religious belief, as well as their social complexion today. A close examination of the socio-demographic characteristics of members in different parts of the Soviet Union and of the stance they adopted towards Soviet socio-political reality during the sixties throws light on the processes that are threatening to extinguish this old and enlightened sect. The emphasis of the paper is on the contemporary Molokan sect, and historical material is introduced only so far as it helps to explain the sect's present situation. As the paper has to rely almost exclusively on Soviet secondary sources, various periods and aspects of the Molokans' development can only be as adequately covered as these sources permit. Whereas the pre-revolutionary history of the sect is well and extensively covered, description of the Molokans' development during Soviet time is very inadequate, being either highly ideologically biased of non-existent for long periods of time. Soviet studies of the contemporary sect, although more rewarding, are unfortunately very localized and, with one exception, do not go beyond 1966. "Contemporary sect" in this paper, therefore, does of necessity mean the sect in the early sixties.

Origins and Beliefs
The Molokan sect evolved out of the Doukhobor sect in the second half of the eighteenth century. The name "the Milkdrinkers" was given to the sect as a nickname by the Orthodox as early as in 1765 because its members were said to have drunk milk during fast time. [See 1 Peter 2:2.] The Molokans themselves deny this tale about the origin of their name and generally prefer to call themselves Spiritual Christians (Russian: Dukhovnye Khristiane). They grew up in opposition to the highly ritualistic, liturgy-orientated and strictly hierarchical Orthodox Church and the feudal social order associated with this Church. They were essentially a rural and peasant sect, although, unlike the very similar Doukhobors, a significant proportion of their members were also merchants, industrialists and townsmen (Russian: meshchane). They first appeared in the heartland of the old Russian sects, the provinces of Tambov and Voronezh, but quickly spread into the Southern provinces and Volga areas. The centres of the sect developed into strong, relatively wealthy and enlightened communities. Religious persecution in the 1840s drove large numbers of them out of these provinces to the periphery of the empire into the Caucasus and to the Far East. They were keen and active proselytizers. On the eve of the Russian revolution, although already declining, they were still the largest and most widely-spread Russian sect. One of their pre-revolutionary leaders estimated their numbers to be over a million in 1913 (N. F. Kudinov, Dukhovnye Khristiane: Molokane, p. 4, quoted in Klibanov 1965, p. 181). This figure is also given by the well-known Bolshevik historian, Bonch-Bruevich, but A. Klibanov (1965), the most notable contemporary Soviet historian of sectarianism, regards this claim as far too high. Internal dissent resulted in numerous schisms splitting the sect into a great number of branches. Some of the better-known ones are the Constant Molokans, the Priguny or Leapers, the Communist Molokans [or, Communalists, Russian: obschie], the Molokans of the Don branch and, the most recent schismatic group, the Maksimisty. "Constant Molokans" was the name given to the main body of the sect after the Priguny and Don Molokans had split off in the 1830s. Constant Molokans still adhere to the teaching of Simon Uklein, the sect's founder, and they form the largest part of the contemporary sect. [However, Miliukov reports that the "original (core) Molokans" split off earlier in Saratov when Dolmatov's judiazers joined.] The Leapers owe their name to the fact that they work themselves into religious ecstasy during which they start leaping about. Like Pentecostalists, they place great emphasis on the Holy Ghost who descends on the chosen. [Pentecostalism really began in America. Read about Molokans visiting the first Pentecostal church in America in 1906, on Azuza Street in Los Angeles. Were Molokans the first to "Speak in Tongues" in Los Angeles?] While the Leapers were thus more intensely sectarian than the Constant Molokans, the Don Molokans adapted themselves to the secular powers and religious establishment and became hardly distinguishable from the Orthodox Church. At the time when the Leapers had abandoned some of their sectarian fervour and developed the same this-wordly orientation as the Constant Molokans, they were rent by schism and the Communist Molokans evolved. They are distinguished by their attempt to live communally, holding all property in common. The Communist and Don Molokan branches were already disintegrating before the revolution and are not mentioned in accounts of the contemporary sect. Leapers, however, are still numerous today. Maksimisty, named after the founder and charismatic leader of the Leapers, Maksim Rudometkin, split off from the branch of the Leapers during the late 1920s. [Lane limits this paper to Molokans in Russia. American Molokan Jumpers evolved much differently than those in Russia, by soon merging with, or being dominated by, "introverted" American Maksimists. The American Constants are still similiar to Russian Constants and have have strengthened their bonds of mutual support since perestroika. See Berokoff, Molokans in America, for more.]
     The Molokan sect is very different both from the Orthodox Church, where some of its spiritual and cultural origins lie, and from the Russian sects of Western origin to which it is akin by virtue of the fact that it originated as a protest movement against an established religious organization and the social conditions that maintained it. From the Orthodox Church the Molokan sect differs radically in all aspects: in dogma, ritual, organization and secular ethics. The Molokans completely abandoned the Orthodox concern with liturgy and renounced nearly all ritual. Their belief that faith must prove itself by good deeds led them to renounce sacraments and icons as useless for the achievement of salvation. They hold Meetings devoted only to prayer, singing and sermons on moral and spiritual themes. They have rejected a hierarchical organization and do not have any priests or churches. Their groups are led and generally administered by elders who evolve out of their midst. Any member of the community can address the congregation and put forward his interpretation of the Bible. This democratic sentiment flows from their idea that God's spirit enters every man equally. Their teaching is based on the Bible, though, unlike the Western sects on Soviet soil, they do not take its content literally but allegorically. Their conception of God is the most distinguishing feature of their faith, shaping, not only the other tenets of their dogma but also their whole outlook on man and society. They view God highly abstractly as a supreme spiritual force, as the highest form of reason, which can reside in any person. They believe in a trinitarian God but Christ does not appear to hold a very prominent place in their teaching.
     The Molokan sect stands apart from most of the other sects in Soviet society by its different response to the world. While the sects of Western origin are, in Wilson's terms, either "conversionist" (the Baptists and Pentecostalists) or "revolutionary" (the Adventists and Jehovah's Witnesses) and the sects of Soviet origin mainly "introversionist" (e.g. the Skritniki or Hiders), the Molokans can be said to belong to the "utopian" type. Wilson stipulates the following characteristics for the "utopian" type of sect: belief in the possibility of salvation in society; the remaking of existing social relations by human efforts working out God-given principles; the withdrawal from society into spatially segregated communities to work out the social organization for salvation (Wilson 1970, p. 47). Molokans rejected the exploitative social relations of the feudal order and obeyed the Tsar only out of necessity, not from reverence. They believed that Molokans did not need wordly government and could best organize their communities themselves. In general, the Molokans do not express their hope for salvation in eschatological terms, but have a this-wordly orientation. Their belief that man can establish God's kingdom here on earth and their vision of the social conditions which would constitute such a kingdom, although based on the Bible, have strong political overtones. In fact, it is emphasized in the Soviet literature that Molokan groups are often more strongly united by their distinctive secular ethic than by narrowly religious orientations. But it is their conception of God which committed them to the socio-political values of equality, brotherhood, pacifism, the use and development of human reason, and self-perfection through work. Because the supreme spiritual force resides in every man, men must be equal, capable of good and thus all worthy to live and sinful to kill. Before Soviet policy made it impossible, Molokans formed their spatially segregated, though not isolated, communities in which they attempted to live according to their beliefs. These principles were rigorously applied only during the short-lived experiment in communal living of the Communist Molokans. The Doukhobors were much more serious in their quest for social equality. In most communities during the long history of the Molokan sect social equality remained just a cherished ideal from which their practice considerably departed. Social differentiation in Molokan villages was considerable, and the richer Molokans used their wealth to secure religious influence. Nevertheless, when exploitation of economic and religious privilege by sect leaders became pronounced, the ideal of equality was invoked and attempts to restore the balance were made. Often conflict would break out over the violation of the equality principle, especially when the mood in the wider society supported it, such as at the time of the 1905 revolution. (See the rebellious words cited by Klibanov (1965, p. 174) from a 1906 Molokan journal.) Other sociopolitical values were more successfully realized, especially the "brotherhood" principle. No Molokan ever had to face economic ruin; help from fellow believers to those in material distress was always forthcoming. Their communities, although sometimes insulated from the rest of society (in the Caucasus, for example), were never isolated from it in the sense Wilson attributes to the words. This feature distinguished them from the otherwise very similar Doukhobor sect which corresponded more to the "introversionist" type. Although the Molokans naturally considered their type of social organization superior to that of their feudal social environment, the drive to impose their social principles on the rest of society does not appear to have been highly developed. In this respect they do thus depart somewhat from Wilson's type but one cannot, therefore, ascribe "introversionist" tendencies to them as they were an extrovert rather than an inward-looking sect. [Except the Maksimisty, who are now "introverted", generally protecting their rituals by avoiding outsiders, photographs, even other Molokans sub-groups.]
    The Molokan sect also had another significant attribute which Wilson does not single out in his description of the "utopian" type. It is, however, very congruous with the "utopian" type as it emphasizes its political leanings (i.e. reliance on human power in the re-organization of social conditions). Molokans have great faith in human reason. Unlike some of the other sects, e.g. the Russian Baptists, they do not believe that man is powerless by himself and has to put his fate entirely into God's hands, but exalt human power of reason. They are convinced that man can perfect himself morally and intellectually and shape his own environment. This conviction has turned Molokans into strong advocates of education and scientific and technological progress. This characteristic manifested itself in pre-revolutionary time in the founding of such Molokan ventures as the Society of Educated Molokans and Kudinov's Progressive Movement about the time of the 1905 revolution. The former sought to bring science and Molokan religion into harmony by disregarding the authority of the Bible in all matters conflicting with science. Among Kudinov's many progressive objectives was the raising of the educational level of all Molokans at a time when education was still the privilege of a few. (For details, see Klibanov 1965, pp. 175-7.)
     Such a short summary of a long and involved period of Molokan history is bound to be somewhat oversimplified. Changing social circumstances, schisms of some sections of the sect and embourgeoisement of others meant frequent deviations from dogma and secular ethic which cannot be adequately covered here. The above outline of the Molokans' belief system is thus best seen as that adhered to with varying degrees of fervour by the main stream of the sect.

State-Sect Relations From 1917-59
With the assumption of Soviet power in 1917 and the subsequent radical restructuring of society, religious sects were suddenly faced with a completely different set of social circumstances than those which originally called them into existence. While under Tsarism the Molokans arose and functioned in hostile response to three different, yet closely related social institutions -- the Tsarist state, the landowning nobility and the Orthodox Church -- under Soviet rule worldly power became more concentrated, and the power of the established Church was destroyed. More importantly, the ideology of the new rulers was materialist and atheist and inspired anti-religious activity. This new social environment forced sectarians to readjust their response to the world. In the following section I shall describe what form the response took, how it was influenced by and, in turn, influenced state-sect relations, and how this readjustment affected the appeal of the Molokan sect to actual and potential followers.
     The Bolsheviks, although opposed in principle to all religious currents, were very sympathetic towards the rationalist religious sects at the time of the Revolution. Some even admired the way they ran their communities and hoped that they would stimulate a general socialist transformation of the countryside. This sympathy on the part of some and toleration on the part of others continued for a number of years after the Revolution. In the euphoria and chaos of the immediate post-revolutionary period a number of new Molokan communes developed, and the sect in general flourished. This period of friendly to tolerant co-existence finished in the late twenties (Klibanov 1969, pp. 250 fit) when the closing of Molokan communes began. What had caused this change in state-sect relationship? Even Soviet writers acknowledge quite widely that from the beginning the Molokan sect had had a very positive attitude towards the Soviet state and the socio-political transformation it had effected. Molokans did not regard socialism as a rival to their own belief but saw a great compatibility between the two. They hailed the new social order as an expression of the Molokan values of equality, brotherhood and intellectual progress. Leaders urged their followers to support the new regime with all their strength, communities gave generously of their funds and proceeds and bestowed on their communes high-sounding socialist names. The only friction between the political and the religious forces was the Molokan refusal to take up arms against the regime's enemies. But this friction was not serious enough to jeopardize relations to the extent they were impaired after 1926. The reason for the change has to be sought in the political leadership's new policy for the transformation of the countryside (Wesson, p. 76).
     By the end of the twenties the Soviet, government had come to the conclusion that the only effective path of agricultural development lay in the setting up of collective and state farms. Communes, they had decided, were neither economically efficient enough nor did they create the brand of socialist consciousness the political leaders favoured. Sectarian communes, however economically successful individually, were now discouraged, and Molokans were urged to join collective farms. It becomes obvious from the sources that compulsion was used in certain cases to dissolve sectarian communes (Kozlova p. 306; Klibanov 1969, p. 250). It remains unclear whether compulsion was a consistent policy in all areas, or whether some communes just died a natural death in the economic competition with collective farms. Sectarian communities on the non-Russian geographical periphery gained a much longer respite from collectivization than those in the R.S.F.S.R. (Porakishvili, p. 113). One source (Tul'tseva, p. 207) intimates that the destruction of sectarian communes did not occur mainly for economic reasons but seemed to be directed against the ideological threat a consolidated Molokan community posed. Tul'tseva mentions a Molokan application to transform their commune into an exclusively Molokan collective farm. This was refused and communards were forced to merge with nonreligious peasants into a collective farm. Although many Molokans complied with the collectivization order, many others for the first time developed hostility towards the Soviet regime and put up stiff resistance. They would rather leave the land and work in the towns than join collective farms (Bograd, p. II 6; Klibanov 1969, p. 10; Kozlova, p. 306). A group in Armenia, for example, adopting a very intransigent attitude towards the Soviet regime, split off from the main body of the sect over this issue and formed a new schismatic group, the Maksimisty. But whether compulsory or voluntary, this driving of Molokans into collective farms dealt a grave blow to the sect. To what extent the ensuing decrease in membership was due to geographical dislocation, with its attendant disruption of religious communities, and to what extent it was due to religious disillusionment caused by increased contact with the alternative world views offered by both the new Western sects and the Communist party is now impossible to determine.
     Many writers point out that the revolutionary fervour and the class conflict in the wider society both at the time of the Revolution and of collectivization deeply affected the social climate in Molokan communities. The poorer strata in the community became aware of their inferior economic status, and class conflict disturbed communities everywhere. New branches were formed, or many left the sect entirely during this time, especially the younger sectarians. (See, for example, Bograd 1961, p. 115, Tul'tseva 1969, pp. 202, 205.) It has to be pointed out, however, that defecting Molokans did not all become unbelievers but, as many authors show, turned in large numbers to the Baptist sect which was coming into prominence after the Revolution. In Ryazan region (R.S.F.S.R.), for example, whole Molokan villages went over to the Baptists (Zlobin, p. 96). [Today at least one group is holding meetings in Ryazan.] Many adherents were lost during this time although the process of decline had begun before collectivization. In Voronezh region, for example, where their number had been estimated to be 2,002 in 1901 (Tul'tseva, p. 198) and 1,600 in 1914 (Aleksandrovich, p. 59) it had sunk to 247 in 1928 (Tul'tseva, p. 204). [Today at least one group is holding meetings in Voronezh.]  In Tambov region, where Molokans had numbered 8,000 in 1915 (Malakhova, p. 80) their number had sunk to 4,500 in 1926 and to 300 by 1959 (Malakhova, pp. 93, 99; Bograd, pp. 115-17). The communities have continued to decrease drastically in post-war years. In the town of Rasskasov, one of the ancient Tambov Molokan centres, they were reduced by over 50 per cent between 1945 and 1949. [Today two groups hold meetings in Tambov, one in the capital city of Tambov made up of original descendants and refugees from Azerbaidjan, and the second on a farm, kolkhoz, made up of Azerbaidjan refugees.] A revolt against the narrow religious traditions by the younger members resulted in a mass exodus of 160 of them (Malakhova, p. 100). Between 1959 and 1971 they were again reduced by 29 per cent (Klibanov 1972, p. 54). In Novogaritovo, another ancient Molokan stronghold, the community had been reduced from 84 members in 1948 to only 15 in 1952 (Bograd, p. 117), while in Michurinsk they declined by 32 percent between 1959 and 1971 (Klibanov 1972, p. 54). In Amur region/Far East, where Molokans were estimated to have been nearly 30,000 in 1909 (from figures of the Tsarist Ministry of the Interior cited by Klibanov 1965, p. 147), a mere 212 were reported to be left in 1962 in Blagoveshchensk, their old Far Eastern stronghold (Sosnina 1962, p. 14). [Today no organized Molokan groups have emerged in the Far East. The large Molokan prayer home there is now used by a Baptist group, though the Molokan sign is still on the building.] Although we have no comparable pre- and post-collectivization figures for the Armenian and Georgian communities, it becomes clear from the sources that the loss in numbers in these areas was not nearly so severe as in the Central Russian regions. The communities in Georgia's Northern Caucasus still had about 10,000 members at the end of the twenties (Klibanov 1969, p. 240). A Georgian community studied by Zolotov in 1962 had lost hardly any members during the preceding 25 years, but had even had a revival after the centenary celebrations in 1953 (Zolotov, pp. 151, 158). The Armenian communities studied by Kozlova in 1963/64, although alleged  to have been losing members, were all still viable in numbers. (The author does not put forward any evidence for this allegation.) There is no evidence to suggest that the continuing decrease in numbers since the period of collectivization is due to any policy of persecution by the political authorities. Because of the greater degree of compatibility of Communist ideology with the Molokan secular ethic than with other sectarian world views, there have been few areas of friction and consequently little need to interfere in the internal life of religious communities. The 1970 register of civil rights prisoners listing members from nearly every religious group, does not mention one Molokan. Why then, have they nevertheless continued to decline? An examination of the more detailed data on socio-demographic characteristic and socio-political responses of Molokan communities in the early sixties will provide us with an answer to this question.

The Socio-demographic Structure of Molokan Groups
Information about contemporary Molokan groups is uneven. While there are detailed data about some Central Russian and two Caucasian centres, and more scanty data about other Caucasian groups and the Far Eastern community, there is none at all about the Volga communities. After giving a short general overview of Molokanism in the Soviet Union today, the paper will focus on the Central Russian communities and the Caucasian groups in Tbilisi/Georgia and in an Armenian village. One author estimates the number of Molokans in the Soviet Union today to be about 13,000 (Malakhova 1968, p. 13). Only Constant Molokans, Leapers and Maksimisty are mentioned in the literature, but the existence of small groups of other branches in some areas must not be excluded. Constant Molokans still seem to be the largest branch, and Maksimisty only a very small group. Maksimisty have not only taken over the name of the legendary Leaper leader Rudometkin but also most of his early teaching (the Leapers themselves have abandoned it). They differ considerably from other Molokans, extolling suffering and emphasizing eschatological ideas. (See Zolotov 1962, p. 154.) Constant Molokan communities are registered with the Soviet authorities, while Leapers and Maksimisty are illegal. The practice of leaping about during moments of religious ecstasy is regarded as a risk to health, while the Maksimisty are held to be politically hostile.
     Besides the groups that form the main subject of this paper, there are large groups in the republic of Azerbaidzhan, the autonomous Northern Ossetian republic and smaller ones in Turkmenistan, the Far East, Siberia and Moldavia. In Azerbaidzhan the biggest community is in its capital, Baku. Its prayer meetings are said to attract between 200 and 300 Molokans. Besides this registered community there are also unregistered groups of Leapers and Maksimisty in Baku as well as many smaller groups of all branches outside the capital (Gladkov and Korytin, pp. 33-40). In the Northern Ossetian A.S.S.R. there is a large community in the capital, Ordzhonikidze (Zolotov, p. 157). In Turkmenistan's capital, Ashkhabad, about 50 people attend prayer meetings, the overwhelming majority being female and old. A similar picture exists in the town of Mary (Chiperis, pp. 75-7). One Molokan is quoted as summing up the fate of Molokanism in Turkmenistan in the following words: "Our fathers and forefathers were Molokans and so are we. We have very little left, we are living out our last days. When we die, Molokanism also dies" (ibid., p. 79). Outside the Caucasus, the already mentioned community in Blagoveshchensk also consists mainly of old and female members (Sosnina, p. 15). We have no information about any other communities.
     The four studies (three sociological, one ethnographic) of Molokan (probably Constant Molokans [Yes. Only Constants were there.]) communities in Tambov and Voronezh regions (R.S.F.S.R.) all show a similar picture of decline: small communities of predominantly elderly and female members with little renewal from within and none at all from outside the community's families. Thus in 1959 in the whole of Tambov district there were left only 330 Molokans spread over 5 rural districts and 2 towns (Malakhova, p. 99). In the Rasskasov town congregation, for example, 80 per cent of members were elderly (Malakhova, p. 100), and in the Michurinsk town community of 28 members, 86 per cent were over 50 years old and only 2 members were under 40. All were hereditary Molokans (Bograd, p. 117). In Voronezh region, two typical communities studied in 1966 had only about 30 members each (Tul'tseva, pp. 209, 210). In both groups the majority of members were old and mainly retired. The rural group had not even any longer a preacher and had received no new recruits during the last 20 years (Tul'tseva, p. 210). Thus in terms of both structure and dynamics of membership the Molokan sect in its traditional homeland differs strongly from the newer sects of Western origin in this area. These all have a higher percentage of younger members and are more successful in recruiting new members both from within and outside the sectarian community. They have consequently been able to keep membership figures much more stable than Molokans in the R.S.F.S.R. (see for example, Klibanov 1969, pp. 61-75 and Bograd 1961, p. 121). Molokans of this area also differ from other sectarians in two other respects. A much higher percentage of their working members is employed in industrial production (Malakhova, p. 102), and, although they have a low formal educational attainment, members (especially male ones) have both an impressive informal education and high educational aspirations for their children. Some men in the Voronezh communities read and knew both the classical literary and political works (Tul'tseva, p. 216). In none of the numerous studies of the Western sects in Russia have such wide cultural attainment and high educational aspirations ever been attributed to members. On the contrary, the lack of them is generally bemoaned.
     The two very thorough and detailed studies of the Molokan sect in Georgia and Armenia reveal stronger and more stable Molokan communities, although some socio-demographic trends are similar. Thus in Georgia there are still over 3,300 registered "Constant" Molokans and about 500 Leapers, the illegal Molokan branch. In Tbilisi (Georgia's capital) alone there were 5 congregations with 1,742 members between them (Zolotov, pp. 156, 157). In Armenia there were still communities in 7 villages (Zolotov, p. 157). In the Armenian village studied by Koziova there were in 1964 a community of Leapers with 269 members, a I 10-strong group of Constant Molokans, and a group of 55 Maksimisty (Kozlova, p. 307). Unlike the Central Russian communities the Caucasian ones have managed to keep membership at a fairly stable level by renewing themselves from members' children (Zolotov, p. 157). But they, too, did not attract any outsiders into the community (Kozlova, p. 361). Since the average age of their members is lower than that of Central Russian Molokans, extinction is not an immediate threat. Renewal from within, however, is gradually becoming less reliable. Although Molokans have close extended families and live in tight-knit communities, the religious influence of the older generation over the younger one is waning. Marriage out of the community was becoming accepted in some of the Armenian groups (Kozlova, p. 310), and the relatively high educational achievement encouraged in Molokan children often estranges them from the traditional way of life of the religious community (Kozlova, p. 316). This process is very noticable in the Tbilisi communities where over 70 per cent of members were over 50 years of age and those under 30 amounted to only 3.2 per cent (Zolotov, p. 156). In the Armenian communities the age structure was still much healthier with the middle-aged (between 30 and 50 years) and the young (up to 30 years) still predominating in numbers (Kozlova, p. 308). But the process was not uniform in the 3 Armenian communities studied. Kozlova's interesting comparison of Molokans of 3 different schismatic groups -- Constant Molokans, Leapers and Maksimisty -- shows that the group of Constant Molokans has much less vitality than the other 2 and is similar in age structure to its Georgian counterpart. [Absent are the "Spiritual", Dukhovnie, Molokans. See Holidays of Molokan Sub-groups.] The Maksimisty, with 41.9 per cent of their members under 30 years of age, were the most thriving group while the Leapers fall half-way between the other two (ibid.). Kozlova's data on occupational position of Molokans reveal that there is a very high percentage of collective farmers in the communities of the Constant Molokans and Leapers but none among the Maksimisty (ibid.). Unfortunately Zolotov does not provide us with any data on occupation, but the largely urban character of his sample makes it unlikely that many are collective farmers.
    On their own all these socio-demographic data give us little explanation of either the general decline of Molokanism or the differential rate of decline in different geographical areas. The tempting hypothesis that Central Russian and Georgian communities have declined more than the Armenian ones because of their urban and non-agricultural character does not hold when confronted with the case of the Maksimisty. In this most thriving community there is not a single collective farmer and 52.7 per cent of members work in industrial production in the town of Dilizhan (Kozlova, p. 308). To gain a feasible explanation we have to interpret these data in conjunction with information on socio-political responses of Molokans to their Soviet environment.

Responses To Soviet Society
As pointed out earlier, Molokan religious dogma, with its this-worldly orientation and its image of man as capable of moral and intellectual self-improvement, has spawned a secular ethic which is expressed both in the socio-political attitudes and the behaviour of sect members. The very similarity of their ethical postulates to some of the tenets of the Soviet Communist ethic has made it much easier for Molokans than for adherents of other religious beliefs to welcome the basic objective of a socialist society: the harnessing of man's powers to the creation of a society where equality, brotherhood and material and intellectual progress reign. How does all this manifest itself? Unlike adherents of many other religious beliefs, Molokans do not strive to withdraw from worldly affairs but are concerned to involve themselves actively in them. Despite their low level of formal education, Molokan men avidly read literary and political classics as well as newspapers, take a lively interest in the political lives of the Soviet Union and other countries, and in the progress of science and technology (Kozlova, p. 31 1; Tul'tseva, p. 216). Elders include information about current affairs in their sermons (Kozlova, ibid.; Bograd, p. 139). Parents try to give their children middle or higher education (Kozlova, p. 316). In interviews many Molokans stressed the great similarity between Communist and Molokan ideals and credited the Soviet state with having realized many objectives of Molokan religion. (Bograd, p. II 8; Malakhova, p. 103.) The achievements of. Soviet society are praised in sermons, and Communist holidays are keenly observed. Molokan respect of Soviet power also manifests itself in observance of laws on religion. They do not proselytize outside their communities (Zolotov, p. 157), and usually do not deny the State the right to their children's moral education by keeping them away from youth organizations (Zolotov, p. 157) as many other sectarians do. Molokans have a positive work attitude and work for the good of society (Tul'tseva, p. 216). Thev are tolerant towards nonMolokans (Tul'tseva, p. 215) and practice neighbourly help by giving material support to people both inside and outside their own communities (Tul'tseva, p. 217; Kozlova, pp. 317, 318).
     All these attitudes and modes of behaviour are ascribed to Molokans both in the Central Russian regions and the Caucasian republics, but they do not characterize all the branches of Molokanism to the same extent. As Kozlova shows very interestingly, this characterization applies most strongly to the Constant Molokans. Of them she says that "they try with all their might to adjust their religion to contemporary Soviet life" (Kozlova, p. 315) and that their children are just like any other Soviet children being represented among the town's party and scientific workers, teachers and engineers, etc. (Kozlova, p. 316). All this applies with less force to the Priguny and not at all to the small and recent schismatic group of Maksimisty. The Maksimisty try to keep themselves completely apart from the political, social and cultural life of their Soviet environment. They have a much less favourable attitude to their worldly masters and concentrate all their energy on the internal life of their religious community. Here strict discipline is demanded from members and their children (ibid.).
     These patterns of socio-political responses are accompanied in each community by definite patterns of religious vitality. The Constant Molokans -- the group most adjusted and attuned to Soviet life -- are facing an organizational decline reflected in the age structure, can rely only on a weak religious commitment and discipline in the community, and have become very flexible in the interpretation of their religious dogma. The Maksimisty, however -- the group most hostile to Soviet values and practices -- have remained most vital organizationally (41.9 per cent of their members are under 30 years of age), can call on a committed and disciplined congregation, and are taking a completely orthodox stand on matters of Molokan dogma. The Leapers -- the branch taking a middle position between Constant Molokans and Maksimisty in their secular life -- occupy also a half-way position as far as their religious life is concerned.
     This definite pattern of an inverse relationship between positive sociopolitical involvement and religious vitality does offer us a clue to the understanding of the general decline of Molokanism in the Soviet Union. It is the very progressiveness of the Molokan secular ethic, the very similarity between it and some postulates of the Communist ethic, which led to its failure as a religious ideology. By propagating the idea that the Soviet powers are putting into practice Molokan religious principles, Molokanism has made itself superfluous. Molokanism in general no longer presents an alternative to people who have rejected the dominant ideology. This is why Molokanism flourished in Tsarist times when it provided the perfect alternative to both the dominant religious and secular ideologies, but now fails to attract any new members from outside its own communities. Those looking for an alternative world view will now turn to the sects of Western origin. Even as far as internal recruitment of new members is concerned, the sect's social and cultural progressiveness has had negative repercussions. By granting their children the opportunity for middle and higher education and by exercising leniency with regard to their extra-community activities in political youth organizations, they have lost many of them as community members.
     Yet the sect has retained a large number of its old members and gained, with varying success, some new members from among their children. It has been able to do this because it still offers one thing to its members that cannot so easily be found in the wider society: community and a sense of brotherhood which manifest themselves in mutual material and moral support. A quotation from a Molokan elder sums up this community spirit very well: "Whether it is night or day, whether I am sleeping or awake, if some joy or misfortune happened (in the community), they call me, and I go to read to them [Bible words fitting the occasion]" (Kozlova, p. 318). Kozlova points out that this certainty of receiving brotherly help and sympathy keeps members in the community even when their faith has gone (ibid.).
     But as was pointed out above, adaptation to the reality of Soviet life has gone equally far among the groups in the Central Russian regions as among the groups in the Caucasian republics, excepting only the Maksimisty. How then is one to explain the differential rate of decline in the two geographical areas? An explanation for it must be sought in the type of community the groups in different parts of the Soviet Union were able to preserve. Molokans in pre- and early post-revolutionary years lived in compact, spatially segregated communities all over Russia. While none of them isolated themselves from the wider society, some were much more insulated from it than others and thus withstood the impact of sovietization much better. The Caucasian Molokans were situated in mountain-surrounded republics whose territory had been included in the Russian empire relatively late in its history. The groups in the heartland of Russia were not protected against disruption by barriers of an ethnic or geographical kind as those in the Caucasus must have been. Whereas Molokan communities in the Caucasus had been surrounded by ethnic groups of a different culture and language and, through years of isolation and intermarriage, became known as a separate ethnic group, Molokans in the R.S.F.S.R. must have found it much harder to keep their identity when they were merged into collective farms with other non-Molokan Russians. This is confirmed by Porakishvili who points out that Doukhobor and Molokan communities in Georgia kept themselves completely apart from the surrounding Armenians and would not accept any propagandists from among them in their midst in the twenties (p. 113). Not only were the Central Russian Molokans more exposed to Communist ideology but also to the beliefs of other sects, notably that of the Baptists. Also the various decrees concerning collectivization were implemented more quickly and more effectively in the Molokan communities near the political centre than in those on the political periphery. Lenin himself advised that the following tactics be employed in the Caucasus: "A slower, more cautious and more systematic transfer to socialism is possible and necessary for the Caucasian republics in distinction to the R.S.F.S.R." (Lenin, quoted in Porakishvili, p. 113). This advice seems to have been heeded because authorities in these areas did not enforce the laws on religion for a long time and did not even like to propagate atheist ideas among the Spiritual Christians there. In a 1927 Georgian party document the following complaint appears: "Up to now the local administration has looked upon the sectarians (Doukhobors and Molokans) as a special kind of people and have not dared to go among them to conduct anti-religious propaganda" (quoted in Porakishvili, p. 130). Thus it seems likely that the communities in Georgia and Armenia managed to consolidate their communities again in the time space between the initial disruption caused by the Revolution and the full impact of Soviet economic and social policies in the middle thirties. When Russian communist propagandists did eventually enter the Caucasus in strength they managed to penetrate the Molokan communities much more quickly than those of the Doukhobors who tried to preserve their isolation. While sect and community were once conterminous for Molokans, religion now no longer dictates their whole way of life. Although compartmentalization has advanced furthest among the Central Russian groups, religious precepts are also rapidly losing influence in most of the Caucasian communities.

Conclusion
The conclusions of this paper are that the Molokan sect in Soviet Russia suffered an almost general decline because it provides no longer an alternative to that offered by their socio-political environment both on the ideological plane and on the level of community organization.
     First, Molokans have not only ceased to protest against the political and social order but have also surrendered their claim to a distinctive philosophy of life. Molokans have declared most of the tenets of their religion to be conterminous with the socio-political and moral values of the dominant Communist ideology. The sect ceased to remain a haven for all those in search of an alternative belief system. In support of this conclusion is the fact that the most successful religious organizations (in terms of retaining old and attracting new, especially younger members) in the Soviet Union today are those which have not fully adjusted to Soviet reality or have even come out in opposition to some of its features namely, the Adventists, Pentecostalists, Mennonites, Jehovah's Witnesses and especially the Baptist schismatic group, the Initsiativniki or Reform Baptists. It is to these sects that people in search of an alternative ethic turn now.
     Sects of the "utopian" type can develop in two ways. Either they break up quickly because life in a sectarian community of this type is too exacting, or they turn to cultivate community for its own sake rather than as a model for the reorganization of the wider society, and thus adopt an "introversionist" response to the world. The Molokans, except for the small schismatic group of Maksimisty who have become as "introversionist" as Soviet society would permit, have followed neither pattern. They are gradually disintegrating, not because they have surrendered their faith, but because utopia, in their estimation, has been realized by political means. Because socialist society, for many Molokans, has put into practice most principles of their faith, they have abandoned their protest stance and are largely continuing their "sectarian" existence by the force of tradition.
     Second, that principle of Molokan ethic which the sect has not fully surrendered -- the provision of brotherhood and neighbourly love in a close-knit community -- has become more and more difficult to implement. This is happening partly because Molokans themselves have never isolated themselves but have accepted social values, e.g. involvement in the wider society, high educational achievement, which tend to work against the establishment of a tight-knit traditional community, and partly because the wider society does not tolerate communities based on other belief systems even if they are as sympathetic to the dominant ideology as Molokan religion is. This loss of community has been much slower for the more remote and better-insulated groups in the Caucasian republics. But with time even these groups will have to give up their distinctive identities and become fully assimilated by their Soviet surroundings. The Molokan sect is therefore likely to continue its slide towards extinction.
      [Since peristroika in 1990, about 150 Molokan communities can be identified today in the FSU. About one-third are registered.]

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